Bayesian hypothesis testing is re-examined from the perspective of an a priori assessment of the test statistic distribution under the alternative. By assessing the distribution of an observable test statistic, rather than prior parameter values, we provide a practical default Bayes factor which is straightforward to interpret. To illustrate our methodology, we provide examples where evidence for a Bayesian strikingly supports the null, but leads to rejection under a classical test. Finally, we conclude with directions for future research.
Introduction
Bayesians and Classicists are sharply divided on the question of hypothesis testing. Hypothesis testing is a cousin to model selection and in a world of high dimensional selection problems, hypothesis testing is as relevant today as it ever has been. We contrast these two approaches, by re-examining the construction of a hypothesis test, motivated by the seminal paper of Edwards, Lindman and Savage (1996) 
(hereafter ELS) who provide the following contrast:
We now show informally, as much as possible from a classical point of view, how evidence that leads to classical rejection of a null hypothesis at the 0.05 level can favor that null hypothesis. The loose and intuitive argument can easily be made precise. Consider a two-tailed t test with many degrees of freedom. If a true null hypothesis is being tested, t will exceed 1.96 with probability 2.5% and will exceed 2.58 with probability 0.5%. (Of course, 1.96 and 2.58 are the 5% and 1% two-tailed significance levels; the other 2.5% and 0.5% refer to the possibility that t may be smaller than -1.96 or -2.58.) So on 2% of all occasions when true null hypotheses are being tested, t will lie between 1.96 and 2.58. How often will t lie in that interval when the null hypothesis is false? That depends on what alternatives to the null hypothesis are to be considered. Frequently, given that the null hypothesis is false, all values of t between, say, −20 and +20 are about equally likely for you. Thus, when the null hypothesis is false, t may well fall in the range from 1.96 to 2.58 with at most the probability (2.58 -1.96)/ [+20 - (-20 )] = 1.55%. In such a case, since 1.55 is less than 2 the occurrence of t in that interval speaks mildly for, not vigorously against, the truth of the null hypothesis. This argument, like almost all the following discussion of null hypothesis testing, hinges on assumptions about the prior distribution under the alternative hypothesis. The classical statistician usually neglects that distribution in fact, denies its existence. He considers how unlikely a t as far from 0 as 1.96 is if the null hypothesis is true, but he does not consider that a t as close to 0 as 1.96 may be even less likely if the null hypothesis is false.
In terms of a decision rule 1 , ELS go on to say:
If you need not make your guess until after you have examined a datum D, you will prefer to guess A if and only if Ω(A|D) exceeds J/I, that is L(A; D) > J/IΩ(A) = Λ where your critical likelihood ratio Λ is denied by the context. Classical Statisticians were the first to conclude that there must be some Λ such that you will guess A if L(A; D) > Λ and guessĀ if L(A; D) < Λ. By and large, classical statisticians say the choice of Λ is an entirely subjective one which no one but you can make (e.g. Lehman, 1959, p.62) . Bayesians agree; Λ is inversely proportional to your current odds for A, an aspect of your personal opinion. The classical statisticians, however, have overlooked a great simplification, namely that your critical Λ will not depend on the size or structure of the experiment and will be proportional to J/I. As Savage (1962) puts it: the subjectivist's position is more objective than the objectivist's, for the subjectivist finds the range of coherent or reasonable preference patterns much narrower than the objectivist thought it to be. How confusing and dangerous big words are (p.67)! Given this discussion, we build on the idea that a hypothesis test can be constructed by focusing on the distribution of the test statistic, denoted by t, under the alternative hypothesis. Bayes factors can then be calculated once the researcher is willing to assess a prior predictive interval for the t statistic under the alternative. In most experimental situations, this appears to be the most realistic way of assessing a priori information. For related discussion, see Berger and Sellke (1987) and Berger (2003) who pose the question of whether Fisher, Jeffreys and Neyman could have agreed on testing and provide illuminating examples illustrating the differences (see Etz and Wagenmakers, 2017) .
The rest of our paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 provides a framework for the differences between Classical and Bayesian hypothesis testing. Section 3 uses a probabilistic interval assessment for the test statistic distribution under the alternative to assess a Bayes factor. Jeffrey's (1957 Jeffrey's ( , 1961 Cauchy prior and the Bartlett-Lindley paradox ( Lindley, 1957, and Bartlett, 1957) are discussed in this context. Extensions to regression and R 2 , χ 2 and F tests (see Connely, 1991 , and Johnson, 2005 , 2008 are also provided.
Section 4 concludes with further discussion and with directions for future research.
Bayesian vs Classical Hypothesis Testing
Suppose that you wish to test a sharp null hypothesis H 0 : θ = 0 against a non-sharp composite alternative H 1 : θ = 0. We leave open the possibility that H 0 and H 1 could represent models and the researcher wishes to perform model selection. A classical test procedure uses the sampling distribution, denoted by p(θ|θ), of a test statisticθ, given the parameter θ. A critical value, c, is used to provide a test procedure of the form
There are two types of errors that can arise. Either the hypothesis maybe rejected even though it is true (a Type I error) or it maybe accepted even though it is false (Type II).
Typically, the critical value c is chosen so as to make the probability of a type I error, α, to be of fixed size. We write α(c) = 1 − c −c p(θ|θ)dθ. Bayes factor, denoted by BF, which is simply a density ratio (as opposed to a tail probability) is defined by a likelihood ratio 
As H 0 : θ = θ 0 and H 1 : θ = θ 0 , the Bayes factor calculates p(θ|θ = θ 0 )/p(θ|θ = θ 0 ).
We will focus on the test statistic distribution under the alternative hypothesis, namely Held and Ott (2018) for additional discussion on p-values and Bayes factors.
A Default Bayes Factor
Our approach is best illustrated with the usual t-ratio test statistic in a normal means problem. As ELS illustrate, the central question that a Bayesian must a priori address is the question:
How often will t lie in that interval when the null hypothesis is false?
To do this we need an assessment to the distribution of the t-ratio test statistic under the alternative. As ELS further observe:
This argument, like almost all the following discussion of null hypothesis testing, hinges on assumptions about the prior distribution under the alternative hypothesis.
The classical statistician usually neglects that distribution in fact, denies its existence. He considers how unlikely a t as far from 0 as 1.96 is if the null hypothesis is true, but he does not consider that a t as close to 0 as 1.96 may be even less likely if the null hypothesis is false.
First, we calculate prior predictive distribution of the test statistic under the alternative and then show how such assessment can lead to a default Bayes factor.
Predictive distribution, Pr(T = t|H 1 )
A simple default approach to quantifying a priori opinion is to assess a hyperparameter, denoted by A, such that the following probability statements hold true:
Pr −1.96
Under the null, H 0 , both the Bayesian and Classicist agree that A = 1. All that is needed to complete the specification is the assessment of A.
In the normal mean testing problem we have an iid sample (y i |θ) ∼ N(θ, σ 2 ), for i = 1, . . . , n, with σ 2 known and nȳ = ∑ n i=1 y i . Under the null, H 0 : θ = 0, the distribution of
where p(θ|H 1 ) denotes the prior distribution of the parameter under the alternative.
Under a normal sampling scheme, this is a location mixture of normals
where T|H 1 , θ is normal with mean √ nθ/σ and variance one; or T = √ nθ/σ + ε, where
Hence an assessment of A will depend on the design (through n) and the relative ratio of measurement errors (through τ 2 /σ 2 ). The gain in simplicity of the Bayes test is off-set by the difficulty in assessing A. The Bayes factor is then simply the ratio of two normal ordinates
The factor A is often interpreted as the Occam factor , Good, 1992 Dickey-Savage. The Bayes factor BF for testing H 0 versus H 1 can be calculated using the Dickey-Savage density ratio. This relates the posterior model probability p(θ = θ 0 |y)
to the marginal likelihood ratio via Bayes rule
Bayes Factor Bounds. Letθ MLE denote the maximum likelihood estimate, then
This implies that, for H 0 : θ = 0,
In a normal means testing context, this leads to a bound,
Under an a priori 1/2-1/2 weight on either side of zero, the bound increases to 0.292.
Hence, at least 30% of the hypotheses that the classical approach rejects are true in the Bayesian world. Amongst the experiments with p-values of 0.05 at least 30% will actually turn out to be true! Put another way, the probability of rejecting the null conditional on the observed p-value of 0.05 is at least 30%. You are throwing away good null hypothesis and claiming you have found effects! In terms of posterior probabilities, with p(H 0 ) = p(H 1 ), we have a bound
Hence, there is at least 12.8 percent chance that the null is still true even in the one-sided version of the problem! Clearly at odds with a p-value of 5 percent.
One of the key issues, as discussed by ELS, is that the classicist approach is based on an observed p-value is not a probability in any real sense. The observed t-value is a realization of a statistic that happens to be N(0, 1) under the null hypothesis. Suppose that we observe t = 1.96. Then the maximal evidence against the null hypothesis which corresponds to t = 0 will be achieved by evaluating the likelihood ratio at the observed t ratio, which is distributed N(0, 1).
Normal means Bayes factors
We have the following set-up for the normal means case (see Berger and Delampaday, 1989 , for the full details): Letȳ|θ ∼ N(θ, σ 2 /n), where σ 2 is known and let t = √ n(ȳ − θ 0 )/σ the t-ratio test statistic when testing the null hypothesis H 0 : θ = θ 0 against the alternative hypothesis H 0 : θ = θ 0 . Also, let ρ = σ/( √ nτ) and η = (θ 0 − µ)/τ, derived from a normal prior in the alternative θ ∼ N(µ, τ 2 ). Usually, we take a symmetric prior and set µ = θ 0 , such that η = 0 and the Bayes factor simplifies to
We can use the Dickey-Savage density ratio as follows to derive the above Bayes factor:
The posterior distribution under the alternative is
with quantities
The posterior mean E(θ|y) can be written as
Substituting into the ratio of ordinates p(θ = θ 0 |y)/p(θ = θ 0 ) gives the result.
In the case where τ is moderate to large, this is approximately
Clearly, the prior variance τ has a dramatic effect on the answer. First, we can see that the "noninformative" prior τ 2 → ∞ makes little sense (Lindley, 1957 , Bartlett, 1957 . For instance, when σ = τ and t = 2.567 (a p-value of 0.01), then the Bayes factor equals 0.16, 1.15, 3.62 and 36.23 for n equal to 10, 100, 1000 and 1000000, respectively (see Section 3.3 for more details about the Bartlett-Lindley Paradox). Secondly, the large effect is primarily due to the thinness of the normal prior in the tails. Jeffreys (1961) then proposed the use of a Cauchy (0, σ 2 ) prior (see Section 3.4 for further details).
Bartlett-Lindley Paradox
See Lindley (1957) and Bartlett (1957) Jeffreys (1961) proposed a Cauchy (centered at θ 0 and scale 1) to allow for fat-tails whilst simultaneously avoiding having to specify a scale to the normal prior. Using the asymptotic, large n, form of the posterior ( √ n/ √ 2πσ) exp{−0.5t 2 } for the usual t-ratio test statistic and the fact that the prior density ordinate from the Cauchy prior is p(θ 0 ) = 1/(πσ), the Bayes Factor is
Cauchy Prior
We have the interval probability Pr(−1.96
for A ≈ 40, when n = 1 and σ 2 = 1. Exact answer given by cdf of hypergeometric Beta
You can also see this in the Bayes factor approximations. Therefore, very different from letting A → ∞, in a normal prior.
Coin tossing: p-values and Bayes
Suppose that you routinely reject two-sided hypotheses at a fixed level of significance, say α = 0.05. Furthermore, suppose that half the experiments under the null are actually true, i.e. Pr(H 0 ) = Pr(H 1 ) = 0.5. The experiment will provide data, y, here we standardize the mean effect and obtain a t-ratio.
Example: Coin Tossing (ELS).
Let us start with a coin tossing experiment where you want to determine whether the coin is "fair", H 0 : Pr(Head) = Pr(Tail), or the coin is not fair, H 1 : Pr(Head) = Pr(Tail). ELS discuss at length the following four experiments where, in each case, the test statistics is t = 1.96. We reproduce below of their Table 1 . Expt 1 2 3 4 n 50 100 400 10,000 r 32 60 220 5,098 BF 0.8 1.1 2.2 11.7 Table 1 : The quantities n and r are, respectively, number of tosses of the coin and the number of heads that barely leads to rejection of the null hypothesis, H 0 : Pr(Head) = Pr(Tail), by a classical two-tailed test at the 5 percent level.
For n coin tosses and r heads, the Bayes factor,
which grows to infinity and so there is overwhelming evidence in favor of H 0 : Pr(Head) = Pr(Tail). This is a clear illustration of Lindley's paradox.
There are a number of ways of assessing the odds. One is to use a uniform prior.
Another useful approach which gives a lower bound is to use the maximally informative prior which puts all its mass on the parameter value at the mle,θ = r/n. For example, in the r = 60 versus n = 100 example, we haveθ = 0.6. Then we have p(y|H 1 ) ≤ p(y|θ)
and for the odds ratio
For example, with n = 100 and r = 60, we have In terms of probabilities, if we start with a 50/50 prior on the null, then the posterior probability of the null is at least 0.118:
Regression
A number of authors have provided extensions to traditional classical tests, for example Johnson (2008) shows that R 2 , deviance, t and F can all be interpreted as Bayes factors.
See also Gelman et al (2008) for weakly informative default priors for logistic regression models.
In the case of nested models, Connelly (1991) proposes the use of
where F is the usual F-statistic, k is the number of parameters in the larger model and d
is the difference in dimensionality between the two models. In the non-nested case, first it helps to nest them if you can, otherwise MCMC comparisons. Zellner and Siow (1980) extend this to the Cauchy prior case, see Connelly (1991) .
Essentially, introduces a constant out-front that depends on the prior ordinate p(θ = θ 0 ).
See Efron and Gous (2001) for additional discussion of model selection in the Fisher and Jeffreys approaches. Additionally, Polson and Roberts (1994) and Lopes and West (2004) study model selection in diffusion processes and factor analysis, respectively. Scott and Berger (2010) compare Bayes and empirical-Bayes in the variable selection context.
Discussion
The goal of our paper was to revisit ELS. There are a number of important take-aways from comparing the Bayesian paradigm to frequentist ones. Jeffreys (1937) provided the foundation for Bayes factors (see Kass and Raftery, 1995 , for a review). Berkson (1938) was one of the first authors to point out problems with p-values.
The Bayesian viewpoint is clear: you have to condition on what you see. You also have to make probability assessments about competing hypotheses. The observed y can be highly unlikely under both scenarios! It is the relative oods that is important. The p-value under both hypotheses are then very small, but the Bayes posterior probability is based on the relative odds of observing the data plus the prior, that is p(y|H 0 ) and p(y|H 1 ) can both be small, but its p(y|H 0 )/p(y|H 1 ) that counts together with the prior
Lindley's paradox shows that a Bayes test has an extra factor of √ n which will asymptotically favor the null and thus lead to asymptotic differences between the two approaches. There is only a practical problem when 2 < t < 4 -but this is typically the most interesting case! Jeffreys (1961) , page 385, said that "what the use of P implies . . . is that a hypothesis that may be true may be rejected because it has not predicted observable results that have not occurred.
This seems a remarkable procedure."
We conclude with two quotes on what is wrong with classical p-values with some modern day observations from two Bayesian statisticians.
Jim Berger: p-values are typically much smaller than actual error probabilities p-values do not properly seem to reflect the evidience in the data. For instance, suppose one pre-selected α = 0.001. This then is the error one must report whether p = 0.001 or p = 0.0001, in spite of the fact that the latter would seem to provide much stronger evidence against the null hypothesis.
Bill Jefferys: The Lindley paradox goes further. It says, assign priors however you wish. You don't get to change them. Then take data and take data and take data ... There will be times when the classical test will reject with probability (1 − α) where you choose α very small in advance, and at the same time the classical test will reject at a significance level α. This will not happen, regardless of priors, for the Bayesian test. The essence of the Lindley paradox is that "sampling to a foregone conclusion" happens in the frequentist world, but not in the Bayesian world.
As we pointed out at the outset, hypothesis testing is still a central issue in modernday statistics and machine learning, in particular, its relationship with high dimensional model selection. Finding default regularization procedures in high dimensional settings is still an attractive area of research.
